



AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

cally weak, politically antidemocratic, and not to be counted upon in the defense of Europe as a whole. But the establishment of air or naval bases in Spain, as a strictly limited policy, awakens less opposition than was the case two or three years ago and can be defended as making easier acceptance by certain elements in America of the European aid program as a whole. Lastly, assistance to Yugoslavia seems to be widely regarded as desirable and in accordance with American interest.

Conflict in Asia

In the Orient in the course of the last 14 months we have become involved in an armed conflict. American policy sought no such conflict. It was directed to the encouragement of movements of national independence, as in the case of Indonesia; to the strict limitation of American military power, as shown by our withdrawal from Korea in 1949; and to the encouragement of democracy, as demonstrated by our policy in Japan. In China the internal failures of the Chinese Nationalist government and its demonstrated incapacity to maintain itself in power left the United States without a clear line of policy. The situation was confused when the North Korean invasion of South Korea acted as catalyst. Invoking the United Nations Charter, our government, with the support of the great majority of members of the world organization, led a movement of resistance against aggression. The North Koreans were defeated, and General Douglas Mac-

Arthur advanced to the Yalu River. Then came the intervention of the Chinese and the dramatic retreat of the United Nations forces. The situation, however, did not prove desperate, and today the lines tend to stabilize for the most part north of the 38th Parallel, the paper boundary between North and South Korea.

American policy in this whole matter can be objectively judged only in a longer perspective. But some things can be stated. (1) Prompt resistance to the North Korean aggression has been generally supported in the United States, largely on the hypothesis that inaction would have led to new aggressions.

(2) It is widely understood that our Korean policy must be concerted with our allies and associates. The dismissal of General MacArthur came about because he could not accept this principle. The general, since his return to this country, has signally failed to convince any important body of opinion, outside the habitual partisan critics of the Administration, that he was right in this respect.

Confining the War

(3) The enlargement of the war in the East is militarily and politically inexpedient. The longer our lines of operation, the more difficult our problem and the greater the force needed to accomplish effective results. We must not allow great armies to be swallowed up in Asia, leaving Europe exposed and straining our relations with our best friends.

(4) On the other hand, it is fair to say that American opinion would not tolerate a withdrawal from the lines on which our troops stand today. Such a withdrawal would furnish admirable propaganda material to the Communists. Our diplomatic objective must be the liberation of all Korea, but in view of the attitude of the Communist delegation at Kaesong, this objective does not seem likely to be achieved for some time.

The Long View

In the very long perspective, we must take into account the possibility of a cooling off of relations between Communist China and the Soviet Union. But no such happy turn of affairs is imminent, and the problem has been complicated by our stiff stand with regard to Formosa and the aid we have given the Chinese Nationalists.

If we look at our policy as a whole, we must recognize its twofold character. On the one hand, we must build up our military strength. But on the other, we must recognize that poverty and distress are the natural allies of communism, and we must not stint economic measures which tend to alleviate these evils.

DEXTER PERKINS

(Professor Perkins is chairman of the Department of History at the University of Rochester. He was official historian for the overseas branch of the OWI at the UN conference at San Francisco in 1945 and served as Cambridge University's first professor of American history and institutions in 1945-46. He is the author of a number of books on American foreign policy.)

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Congress and Foreign Aid

WASHINGTON — The execution of American foreign policy is changing the organization of the American government. The United States now has a "total" foreign policy in the sense that issues within the jurisdiction of almost every federal agency have a projection abroad. The effort to centralize these foreign policy interests in the State Department has not satisfied Congress. The establishment of the Economic Cooperation Administration in 1948 emphasized the dissatisfaction but did not eliminate it.

One of the major issues in the debate on the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (which the House passed on August 17 and the Senate passed on August 31) was the kind of administration the act would receive. The House voted to create a new Mutual Security Administration, which would execute the military assistance program, the Marshall plan and the technical assistance program (Point Four). The Senate voted to center responsibility for the three programs in the Executive Office of the President, and leave the administrative details of military help to the Secretary of Defense, of Point Four to the Technical Cooperation Administration and, for the time being, of the Marshall plan to the ECA. The Senate bill, however, calls on the President by next March 30 to submit a plan to Congress for the abolition of ECA and the transfer of its powers and functions elsewhere.

Whatever scheme the Senate and House conferees adopt, the lessening of the State Department's authority is certain. The distrust of the department is only incidentally connected with distrust of Secretary of

State Dean Acheson. The question is organic rather than personal. The attitude at the Capitol is that foreign policy is too extensive for the State Department alone to carry it out.

New Foreign Aid Program

In the course of their discussion of the administration of the Mutual Security Act the House and Senate severely reduced the size of the foreign aid program which the executive branch is to administer. Presi-

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dent Truman, in his budget message last January 15, proposed a foreign aid program of \$9.5 billion. On May 24 he asked Congress for \$8.5 billion. But the House voted for \$7.498 billion and the Senate for \$7.286 billion.

In geographic areas, Europe suffered most from the reduction; while in functions, economic aid drew the sharp side of the ax. The President had asked \$1,675 million in economic help for Europe. The Senate authorized \$880 million. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., deputy administrator of the ECA, told Congress that European economic help is meant to bolster the military program. General Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House

Foreign Affairs Committee that the economic and military aid programs "are so integrated that each one is essential. It is hard to say you can do one and not the other and still expect to accomplish our purpose." Congress authorized the use of \$500 million from the European counterpart funds for military production, construction, equipment and material in countries receiving military aid. Otherwise the arguments of Bissell and Bradley made little impression.

The pending bill gives the administrators of the program, whoever they turn out to be, some flexibility in execution. In Europe, military assistance is to go not only to the countries in the North Atlantic treaty but also to "any country of Europe which the President determines to be of direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area." The Senate bill authorizes the President to spend \$396,250,000 in military aid to Greece, Turkey and Iran, dividing it how he pleases, and he may spend up to 10 per cent of that amount for military help to other Near East and African countries which qualify for the aid. The bill authorizes the use of \$160 million for economic and technical help to Africa and the Near East. The Senate bill directs the President to spend up to \$535,250,000 for military help in the "general area of China" (which is commonly interpreted as Nationalist China, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Indo-China and Thailand) and up to \$178,750,000 for economic and technical help to Asian and Pacific countries not under Communist control

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What Should Be Our Policy Toward China?

by Nathaniel Peffer

Professor Peffer of Columbia University argues that the United States should drastically change its policy toward China, admitting Peiping to the UN if a Korean truce is achieved. Professor Peffer spent many years in China, beginning in 1915. He is author of a number of books on the Far East.

IF ONE is not moved by considerations of domestic politics or inexplicable passions for Chiang Kai-shek and his associates, there is only one logical American policy toward China: at the very least, end the vendetta; if at all possible restore the relation of mutual trust that once obtained between the Chinese and ourselves. To win China over to our side unreservedly is probably impossible for some time, but to detach it from complete affiliation with Russia is not necessarily impossible. To this end our policy must be designed, and if it succeeds, that is enough for our purpose.

How can that be accomplished?

Four Crucial Points

Four things have made the breach between the United States and China: (1) our long-continued help to Chiang Kai-shek; (2) our refusal to recognize the Communist government as the effective government of China and our pressure on other nations to do likewise; (3) our ostracism of Communist China in the United Nations; and (4) our prohibition of any attempt by the Communists to take Formosa. And it must be said at once that as long as our attitude on these four points remains unchanged there will be no end to Communist China's hostility and it will be the ally of any enemy we have, whether Russia or any other country. If that is true, we shall have no genuine support in Asia, certainly not from any country whose support is effective—this may even include Japan after it is free to choose its course. There will be no

stability in our relations with China, and there will consequently be no stability in the whole Eastern world. We shall be vulnerable there and everywhere else.

Therefore, I would change our attitude on all four points.

Our support of Chiang Kai-shek is not only ignoble in the eyes of the rest of Asia but from the point of view of pure power it is futile. The most that can be hoped from Chiang is that he will remain safe on Formosa behind the bulwark of our Seventh Fleet. To believe that he can regain control of China is fantastic. The rule of the Chinese Communists may very well pass in time. Their present exactions on the people to support the Korean war have already disillusioned many and will alienate more. What group will succeed the Communists if they fall, no one can even guess now; but it will certainly not be the Nationalists. If with American support the Nationalists should attack on the mainland in the near future, even those Chinese now alienated by the Communists will turn against the Nationalists. Of Chiang Kai-shek and his followers the Chinese have had enough. For us to continue to support Chiang Kai-shek is, then, senseless.

Nor is there any point in not recognizing Mao Tse-tung's government as the government of China. It does govern China and will continue to do so for a long time. To refuse to acknowledge that fact is childish petulance. In proportion as we dislike the Peiping regime we ought to be in a position to observe it so that

we can learn as much as we can about it. Only then can we act effectively toward it. And if it does not fall at all or in the visible future, are we to exclude China perpetually from international intercourse? This, too, is senseless.

Seating Peiping in UN

By the same token there is no logic in not admitting the representatives of Communist China into the United Nations—after the Korea affair is settled, of course. Why not? What harm would be done? In what way is our security affected? The Russian bloc then has another veto? What difference would that make? Russia can do as much with one veto as with two or twenty-two. The Russian bloc would have one more vote toward a majority of seven to use against us? Then what? We, too, have a veto. Nothing of vital importance is affected by the admission of Communist China into the United Nations.

As to Formosa: Do we really expect to keep the Seventh Fleet going round and round, Formosa, in perpetuity to prevent the Communists from taking it or to support the Chiang rump regime until the distant day when the Communists may fall? And when they do fall, will any Chinese regime, even a Nationalist regime, give us Formosa or even renounce it for international control? Of that there is not the slightest chance. Any Chinese government will be compelled by its own people to recover Formosa, and only superior force will prevent it from

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by **George E. Taylor**

Professor Taylor opposes giving recognition or comfort to Communist China. Director of the Far Eastern Institute at the University of Washington, he has also lived in China and served as expert on the Far East for the OWI and on psychological warfare for the State Department. He has written several books on China.

CHINA is an integral part of the Soviet orbit. The Moscow-Peiping alliance is firmly based on mutual understanding and mutual interest. For Peiping the alliance is to bring the means, both military and political, for Chinese domination of the Asian world. For Moscow the alliance may bring the alienation of the whole Asian world from Europe and America, a necessary step, as Lenin once suggested, toward the conquest of Europe. Europe, for the Soviet Union, as for us, has first priority. Such an alliance is firmly founded and not easily broken.

Strong Communist Ties

It is our job to turn China from an asset into a liability for the Soviet Union. How can Peiping be separated from Moscow? Certainly not by generosity and sweet reasonableness. An analysis of Chinese communism is no simple problem; but it seems wise to proceed on the assumption that the Chinese Communist elite is an integral part of the international Communist movement. Whatever originality or independence the Chinese Communists have shown seems to be completely overshadowed by their ideological debt to Lenin and Stalin. From the Soviet Union itself came decisive military assistance in the civil war through the transfer in 1945 of Japanese arms to the Chinese Communists and Soviet blocking of the main ports of entry into Manchuria. This gave the Communists military superiority, not over all Nationalist forces but over those in Manchuria, turning the tide of battle and sap-

ping the morale of the Nationalists.

Long before Peiping intervened in Korea, both documents and deeds indicated that the Chinese Communists shared with their Soviet colleagues a belief in the collapse of the "capitalist" world that would "provoke" the holocaust out of which the Communists would emerge victorious. Men engaged in a common enterprise do not necessarily remain loyal to each other. But all available evidence compels us to proceed on the assumption that the interests of the Chinese Communists are bound up with the fortunes of the Soviet world. To suggest that we could "wean" them away from the Kremlin is to offer a false alternative. The Chinese Communists are not for sale. They believe they have chosen the winning side, and the Soviet power position is strong enough to crush any move toward Titoism.

The common argument that communism in China developed out of internal forces is partly true, if properly understood. The Communist elite used and manipulated those forces. But the suggestion that they are leading the "revolution" in China, whatever that means, arises from wishful thinking, sloppy analysis or easily identified calculation. It is more realistic to assume that the Chinese, like the Russian, Communists represent a new version of political reaction and are out for total political control by and for a party-bureaucratic elite. They won China through a combination of ideas, force and a powerful ally.

Only force in one form or another can influence the behavior of Pei-

ping. Whether or not we secure a truce in Korea, we must continue the pressure on the Peiping regime. We should always make it clear that we will deal with an independent China; but the present regime will never break its alliance with the Kremlin unless it is seriously challenged from within or without. Our policy toward China, therefore, should be to put the greatest possible strain on the present regime in order to complicate its relations with its own people as well as with its Soviet ally. Why feed its internal and external prestige by letting it have Formosa, a seat in the UN or a voice in a Japanese peace treaty? Have we forgotten Hitler?

Cessation of hostilities in Korea on terms involving a united Korea and UN control would be such a blow to the Soviet orbit that it would be worth our while. But economic pressure and other measures should be kept up on China with a view to complicating the problems of Peiping as much as possible.

Chiang's Role

The role of Chiang Kai-shek depends largely on the political context. Until other leadership emerges, he has to be used. But the extent to which we identify ourselves with his activities against the mainland should vary in direct ratio to his political appeal. This appeal depends mainly on the ability of the Nationalist government to formulate and communicate new ideas.

Apart from the decisions which a militant and imperialist Chinese regime may impose upon us, the most important thing we can do to subvert the Peiping regime must be done outside of China. We need allies. When time is short, non-Communist regimes which we do not necessarily admire may well have to

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Peffer

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doing so. In other words, unless we abandon our notions of Formosa as an American bastion, we shall face a hostile China and a suspicious if not hostile Asia. If Formosa in unfriendly hands is a vital menace to us—which is highly doubtful except for senatorial forensic purposes—our only recourse is to contrive that the country nearest Formosa, which is China, is not unfriendly to us. Therefore we had better forget about Formosa.

All this is on the assumption that there will be a truce in Korea and an eventual settlement of Korea such that China has been denied the fruits of the aggression of which it is undoubtedly guilty. The Peiping regime has already failed in Korea; that seems clear. It has already been punished; its losses are ample evidence. Only when that is established would I proceed to lay the basis of

a general settlement with China, and then I would waive our present position on the four points at issue. After that I would wait for Russian aggressiveness and innate Chinese suspicion of Russia to work for us in driving the two countries apart.

Taylor

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be brought into camp. But our long-range policy must be to assist those political and social forces in Asia which are going our way. The most obvious of these forces are nationalism and the drive for economic betterment. They must be both taken in combination. In contrast to the Kremlin's technique of manipulation through professional revolutionaries, our own policy must be directed toward establishing a common sense of direction with the significant political leaders and intellectuals of Asia. These men may or may not be the present ruling groups. In some cases we may well find our-

selves working for considerable political and social change.

Such a task demands first a full understanding of the concepts, aspirations and problems of the intellectuals and political leaders of Asia. This involves a full and continuing study of Leninist-Stalinist ideology in the forms in which it reaches Asian countries. Next we have to understand our own case. We must know what basis there is for mutuality of interest, for only then can we state our case in terms of the other fellow's case. We have shown in the one country we controlled, Japan, that we can think of social direction and policy in three dimensions. If we can do as well, or better, in our relations with the free countries of Asia, we can ring the arrogant and fanatical dictatorship of Peiping with peoples whose minds it cannot touch. The isolation of Peiping can be achieved through such a combination of ideas and force.

FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT



After San Francisco — Europe

As soon as the San Francisco conference on the Japanese peace treaty is over, the spotlight will be turned on a series of conferences designed to strengthen and expand the machinery of cooperation between the United States and its European allies and to bring about restoration of peace with other former enemy countries.

'German San Francisco'

During the early part of September the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain and France, at a meeting in Washington, were expected to lay plans for a "German

San Francisco" conference by the end of this year with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Such a meeting would consider a security treaty providing for the West German contribution to the European army and a contractual agreement defining the Federal Republic's political and economic sovereignty to be signed by the four powers. Differences still exist between the Western allies as to the size of the German military units; the over-all percentage of the German armed forces to the total European force (it has been decided that the German contribution can be no more than 20

per cent, but whether the figure is to be 20 per cent or less has not yet been agreed); and the financing of a new German army (the Germans say that if they are to pay for their own armed forces there must be a drastic cut in Allied occupation costs in Germany, a view opposed by the French).

The Allies do not want to sign a contractual agreement until Germany's firm pledge to raise forces for a European army has been obtained, for fear that once West Germany has recovered its sovereignty, it may show less willingness to comply with Allied military require-

As Others See Us

The *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of Zurich, Switzerland, a serious and well-informed daily considered by German-speaking Europeans comparable to the London *Times*, carried in May a dispatch from its correspondent in Casablanca on Americans in French Morocco. In this dispatch the correspondent reported French criticisms of various American actions, then commented as follows:

"Objective observers in Morocco are generally convinced, however, that the American actions which are thus criticized proceed from misunderstanding and clumsiness, rather than a Machiavellian political design.

"Many Americans, of course, who came to Morocco after the war brought with them something of that missionary spirit which sees in the application of American forms of democracy the ideal solution for the problems of all nations. But on the whole a few months in Morocco have sufficed to make them revise their prejudices. The undeniably impressive achievements of the French in the social, economic and political fields have been recognized even by opponents of every form of colonialism. And the Americans,

for whom the pioneer spirit of the French is particularly striking, cannot understand, and are irritated by, the natives' indolent conservatism and lack of enthusiasm for any kind of modernisation."

The French economic weekly, *L'Economie*, which opposes controlled economy and advocates as much return as possible to a policy of *laissez-faire* in France, discussing the Korean war said editorially on July 5:

"The *coup de force* of Korea has had for the old Western powers another advantage which is far from being negligible. An important action of American public opinion had on Europe, and on the administration of the territories which it controlled, ideas that were perhaps generous, but dangerous precisely by their excess of generosity and their lack of realism. The European countries appeared as monsters of egoism and of impotence which dreamed only of maintaining themselves in overseas territories with a view to obtaining an exclusive and immediate profit. The Korean war has once more given the war in Indo-China all its significance, and the theory of 'anticolonialism' for which so many Americans, and certainly not the least important, have broken lances, has had to be seriously revised and adapted to political and economic realities, which has saved the

Western world from ordeals that might have proved fatal to it."

Congress

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(generally limited to Nationalist China, the Philippines, Indo-China, Thailand, Indonesia, Burma, Afghanistan, Ceylon, Nepal, Pakistan and possibly India). The bill authorizes \$69,750,000 for the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, \$38,150,000 for military aid to American republics and \$21,250,000 for American republics' economic and technical aid.

The administrative plan embodied in the Senate bill carries forward the development of the White House as an institution along lines first laid down in 1939. In that year Congress at the request of President Roosevelt, established the Executive Office, providing the President with seven administrative assistants, each with "a passion for anonymity," to ease his labors. In 1947 Congress gave the Executive Office responsibility for conceiving foreign policy by setting up the National Security Council. President Truman's appointment in 1950 of W. Averell Harriman as his special assistant on foreign affairs underlined the importance of the Executive Office to which the Senate is now drawing attention.

BLAIR BOLLES

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In the next issue

A Foreign Policy Report

The Muslims and the West

by Wilfred C. Smith

Distinguished authority on Islam

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ments. A controversy has also arisen over a "protective clause" in the contractual agreement empowering the Allies to intervene in Germany any time they believe democracy is endangered. This clause is regarded by some Germans as a derogation of sovereignty. The Germans, moreover, have shown increasing dissatisfaction over Allied economic controls, notably respecting coal exports, and have been pressing for an end to all economic restrictions as a condition for final approval by the Bundestag of the Schuman plan for merging Western Europe's coal and steel industries.

More Arms for Italy?

In Washington, too, are scheduled to take place conversations between United States government representatives and Alcide de Gasperi, premier of still another former enemy country. Italy, noting the favorable terms granted to Japan under the San Francisco treaty, is expected to demand the removal of limitations on its armed forces imposed by the Italian peace treaty of 1947. Since Russia was a party to this treaty, Moscow is expected to protest its revision. To such a protest Washington would reply by pointing to the Russian-sponsored rearmament of the Axis satellites, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, in excess of their peace treaty levels. Russia, however, will not be alone in opposing Italy's rearmament. Objections will also come from Yugoslavia—partly because Belgrade fears that military concessions to Italy will serve as justification for still further strengthening of the striking power of its hostile Balkan neighbors, partly because Yugoslavs feel that a rearmament, which is already restive about the zone of Trieste assigned to Yugoslavia, may once more seek to extend its way to the Dalmatian coast.

While Marshal Tito, as indicated by his friendly conversations at the end of August with W. Averell Harriman, special assistant to President Truman, is eager to obtain Western military aid against possible Russian aggression, he is reluctant to have Yugoslavia become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The first full-dress session of the NATO Council is scheduled to start in Ottawa on September 15, and another session will be held in Rome during October. At these meetings the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, at one time opposed by Britain and the Scandinavian countries on the ground that the coalition's military resources would thereby be spread too thin, will be discussed, and the entrance of the two eastern Mediterranean nations now seems assured. It has also been reported that Yugoslavia might be willing to conclude security arrangements with Greece and Turkey. Prospects for a Middle Eastern security pact in some way linked to the Western coalition, favored by Britain, appear dim and have been further jeopardized by tensions in that area created by the murder of King Abdallah of Jordan, Israel's clashes with Syria, the unresolved oil controversy in Iran and the Arab resistance precipitated by the UN Security Council's resolution of September 1 calling on Egypt to end restrictions that have prevented Israel-bound ships from passing through the Suez Canal.

East-West Trade

While this series of military and political conferences are under way, a meeting of trade experts representing Europe's East and West has been held, unheralded, in Geneva under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Europe. The participating nations have been Britain,

France, Denmark, Hungary, Poland and the U.S.S.R. Moscow has recently attacked the foreign trade policy of the United States, charging this country with the erection of trade barriers directly contrary to the national interests of Western and Eastern Europe as well as of China and Japan. The Kremlin may be expected to press this argument harder in the months ahead, conceivably with some success. Anthony Eden, Conservative British leader, pointed out at a press conference in New York on August 28 that Britain needs timber and coarse grains from Russia. Moreover, UN reports released in August show that West Germany and Japan have registered remarkable economic gains, and German export trade has rapidly increased, largely at the expense of the British. The Soviet government, taking advantage of the mounting trade competition between leading industrial nations, both victors and vanquished, may hold out the temptation of new markets in the East, including Communist China.

To counter this temptation, the United States may have to offer a larger market here for Germany and Japan—or else continue to subsidize their economies indefinitely. As the NATO structure is expanded to include other than North Atlantic nations and fresh emphasis is placed on East-West trade, it becomes increasingly apparent that integration of Western Europe, urged by the National Planning Association in its recent pamphlet, *Making Western Europe Defensible*, by two former ECA officials, may not prove sufficient for the fulfillment of our objectives. What is needed is closer integration of the United States with Western Europe.

VERA MICHELES DEAN